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Abstract. In the course of theorising, it can be appropriate to replace one concept—a folk concept, or one drawn 
from an earlier stage of theorising—with a more precise counterpart. The best-known account of concept 
replacement is Rudolf Carnap’s ‘explication’. P.F. Strawson famously critiqued explication as a method in 
philosophy. As the critique is standardly construed, it amounts to the objection that explication is ‘irrelevant’, fails 
to be ‘illuminating’, or simply ‘changes the subject’. In this paper, I argue that this is an unfair characterisation of 
Strawson’s critique, spelling out the critique in more detail and showing that, fully understood, it is not 
undermined by extant responses. In light of both the critique and extant responses, I close by making some 
substantive comments about what explication can, and cannot, be used to do in philosophy. 
1. Introduction 
In the course of theorising, it can be appropriate to replace one concept—a folk concept, or one drawn 
from an earlier stage of theorising—with a more precise counterpart. For example, on discovering that 
there are many rocky and icy objects with orbits and sizes quite similar to those of Pluto, including an 
object, Eris, more massive than Pluto, astronomers deemed the everyday concept of planet to be 
inadequate. The concept lacked an accepted definition, making it unclear whether or not the discovery 
of Eris constituted the discovery of a tenth planet. Eris, it seemed, was a borderline case. As such, 
astronomers explicitly defined a new concept of planet to replace its predecessor—a concept that 
definitively excluded Eris, as well as Pluto and other similar objects.1  
                                                     
1 See International Astronomical Union 2006. 
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An account of concept replacement, or explication, was famously developed by Rudolf 
Carnap.2 He defended the use of explication in science, logic, mathematics and philosophy. In by far 
the most influential critique of Carnap’s account of explication, P.F. Strawson criticises the claim that 
explication can help to solve philosophical problems.3 As the critique is standardly construed, two 
passages are given particular weight. Firstly: 
[…] to offer formal explanations of key terms of scientific theories to one who seeks 
philosophical illumination of essential concepts of non-scientific discourse, is to do something 
utterly irrelevant—is a sheer misunderstanding, like offering a text-book on physiology to 
someone who says (with a sigh) that he wished he understood the workings of the human 
heart. (Strawson 1963: 505) 
Secondly: 
[…] typical philosophical problems about the concepts used in non-scientific discourse cannot 
be solved by laying down the rules of use of exact and fruitful concepts in science. To do this 
last is not to solve the typical philosophical problem, but to change the subject. (p. 506) 
The underlying objection is typically glossed as being that, when it comes to philosophy, explication 
is ‘irrelevant’, fails to be ‘illuminating’, or simply ‘changes the subject’.4 
 This is not, however, a fair characterisation of Strawson’s critique. The critique is more subtle 
than is generally acknowledged and, consequently, is not undermined by extant responses. More 
importantly, once the critique has been spelt out, we are better placed to delimit the role that 
explication can play in philosophical methodology. 
 My aim in this paper is twofold. First, I aim to correct our understanding of Strawson’s 
critique of explication as a method in philosophy. Second, in light of both the critique and extant 
                                                     
2 See e.g. Carnap 1947; 1950. 
3 See Strawson 1963. 
4 See e.g. Brun 2016: 1219; Dutilh Novaes and Reck 2017: 202; Justus 2012: 170–171; Loomis and Juhl 2006; Maher 2007: 
332; Olsson 2015: 69; Schupbach 2015: 12–13. 
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responses, I make some substantive comments about what explication can, and cannot, be used to do 
in philosophy. 
2. Explication 
Explication is the replacement of one or more concepts, the explicandum or explicanda, with more 
precise counterparts, the explicatum or explicata. Explicanda can be folk concepts or concepts from 
an earlier stage of theorising; and explicata can (but need not) be expressed using the same words as 
corresponding explicanda, as in the case of PLANET.5 
 An explicatum is to satisfy four requirements “to a sufficient degree” (1950: 7). Firstly, the 
explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum “in such a way that, in most cases in which the 
explicandum has so far been used, the explicatum can be used” (ibid.).6 Secondly, the explicatum is to 
be precise, or at least more precise than the explicandum, in virtue of explicit rules of use (or 
definition) given in terms of a “well-connected system” of concepts (ibid.). Thirdly, the explicatum is 
to be fruitful, in the sense that it facilitates the “formulation of many universal statements (empirical 
laws in the case of a nonlogical concept, logical theorems in the case of a logical concept)” (ibid.). 
Fourthly, the explicatum is to be simple. 
Here is an example given by Carnap (pp. 12–15). It involves the replacement of the 
prescientific concept WARMER, understood to depend solely on our sensations, with the explicatum 
TEMPERATURE, understood as a quantitative concept. The four requirements are satisfied as follows. 
First, similarity: in most cases in which x is (according to our sensations) warmer than y, the 
temperature of x is greater than the temperature of y. Second, precision: rules of use for 
                                                     
5 Here and below I use small capitals to denote concepts. 
6 This is not best interpreted in terms of the extensions of explicanda and explicata. Rather, it is better to construe similarity 
as requiring an explicatum to be suitable for performing at least the theoretical work performed by the corresponding 
explicandum (and perhaps more). For example, as Brun notes (2016: 1221), one might explicate the concept PROPOSITION 
with the concept SET OF POSSIBLE WORLDS, even if one thinks that the extension of PROPOSITION does not contain any sets of 
possible worlds. Here, the concepts are similar in the sense that, relative to the specific context in which the explicatum is 
used, the explicatum “performs the explicandum’s function” (Brun 2016: 1222). 
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TEMPERATURE can be precisely defined with reference to thermometers. Third, fruitfulness: 
TEMPERATURE features in (for example) the ideal gas law. And, fourth, simplicity: both the rules for 
the use of TEMPERATURE, and the laws in which it features, are simple. In light of such considerations, 
Carnap takes TEMPERATURE to be “the [explicatum of WARMER] important for science” (p. 14). 
 The explicatum replaces the explicandum in relevant theoretical contexts. Thus, in theoretical 
contexts in which physicists (qua physicists) would have used the explicandum WARMER, they ought 
now to instead use the explicatum TEMPERATURE. This will not, in general, be a simple instance-for-
instance replacement—trivially so in the present case given that WARMER, but not TEMPERATURE, is a 
comparative concept. An explicatum replaces an explicandum in a theoretical context in the sense 
that, in that context, the explicatum will do at least the theoretical work that was done by the 
explicandum (and possibly more).7 
 Some comments are in order. First, explication is sometimes characterised as introducing 
formal systems of concepts.8 For example, Strawson writes that  
[the] method is to construct a formal system, which uses, generally, the ordinary apparatus of 
modern logic and in which the concepts forming the subject-matter of the system are 
introduced by means of axioms and definitions. (1963: 503) 
However, as has been made clear by Brun (2016: 1217f) and Dutilh Novaes and Reck (2017: 200f), 
this should not be thought of as a requirement. Rather, as Carnap writes in Meaning and Necessity, 
explication involves “replacing [a vague or not quite exact concept] by a newly constructed, more 
exact concept” (1947: 8, my emphasis). One advantage of understanding explication in this way is 
that it better reflects actual scientific and philosophical practice, which—as illustrated by the opening 
example of PLANET—often involves the construction of concepts that are informal or, at least, not 
fully formalised. 
                                                     
7 See e.g. Brun 2016: 1218. 
8 Suggestive comments along these lines can be found in, for example, Maher 2007, Schupbach 2015, and Strawson 1963. 
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 Second, Carnap is typically held to have prioritised the fruitfulness requirement over 
similarity, precision and simplicity. Thus, for example, Schupbach writes that “Carnap plays favorites 
with regards to his desiderata, prioritizing fruitfulness over similarity” (2015: 7) and Dutilh Novaes 
and Reck write that “fruitfulness is ultimately the most significant requirement for an explication 
overall” (2017: 202). The thought, as I understand it, is twofold. First, a concept requires a sufficient 
degree of fruitfulness, similarity, precision and simplicity to count as an explicatum. Second, given 
multiple candidate explicata—that is, concepts with a sufficient degree of fruitfulness, similarity, 
precision and simplicity—fruitfulness is prioritised as the most important factor in determining which 
of those candidates to choose. Importantly, though, we ought not to build the prioritisation of 
fruitfulness into the method of explication per se. An explication is performed so long as the 
explicandum is replaced with a candidate explicatum, whichever factors one subsequently prioritises 
in determining which candidate explicatum to choose.  
Third, as I have characterised explication, it involves not merely the introduction of explicata 
but also the replacement of explicanda. Thus, if a theorist constructs an explicatum but goes on to use 
both it and the explicandum in relevant theoretical contexts, then she has not fully explicated the 
explicandum. If a physicist (qua physicist) continues to find it convenient to use WARMER when (say) 
theorising about pressure and volume, then she has not fully explicated that concept. I will say that the 
mere construction and introduction of explicata is a partial explication; if the explicanda are also 
replaced, then it is a full explication. For terminological ease, I take both partial and full explication to 
be types of explication.  
To avoid misunderstanding, let me clarify two points about the partial/full distinction. First, 
both types of explication are compatible with explicanda being used outside of the relevant theoretical 
contexts. The physicist who fully or partially explicates WARMER may nonetheless use that concept 
when (say) she compares the potatoes and carrots over the dinner table. Second, the distinction does 
not represent a meta-theoretical choice: there are no ‘full-explicationists’ or ‘partial-explicationists’. 
Rather, when there is specific reason to eliminate the explicanda—perhaps because new discoveries 
have shown the explicanda not to be fit for their intended purposes, as in the case of PLANET—the 
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theorist will fully explicate the explicanda; lacking any such reason, she may either fully or partially 
explicate the explicanda. 
3. Strawson’s Critique 
Strawson’s critique is often characterised—or caricatured—as an objection to explication on the 
simple grounds that explication is ‘irrelevant’ and ‘changes the subject’. However, the critique is 
more subtle and deserving of careful examination than this characterisation suggests. In this section I 
develop the critique, leaving critical discussion for subsequent sections. 
3.1 Preliminaries 
Strawson’s stated aim is to discuss the “comparative merits of two methods of philosophical 
clarification” (1963: 503). The first method is explication (although Strawson calls it ‘rational 
reconstruction’); the second method consists of “the attempt to describe the complex patterns of 
logical behaviour which the concepts of daily life exhibit” (ibid.), and falls under the umbrella of 
‘ordinary language philosophy’. I focus exclusively on Strawson’s consideration of the merits of 
explication.  
 Although Strawson is not explicit, he is naturally interpreted as taking philosophical 
clarification (or philosophical illumination) to consist of the clarification of concepts for the purposes 
of solving philosophical problems and answering philosophical questions. The central type of 
philosophical problem that he highlights is “dealing with paradox and perplexity” (p. 515):9 
For it often happens that someone reflecting on a certain set of concepts finds himself driven 
to adopt views which seem [...] paradoxical or unacceptably strange. (ibid.) 
                                                     
9 Strawson distinguishes two additional, interrelated types of philosophical problem. The first is “the attempt to explain [...] 
why it is that we have such concepts and types of discourse as we do” (pp. 515–516). This is not a historical inquiry, but 
rather an inquiry into why, given our natures, it is natural for us to have the particular conceptual framework that we do. The 
second is the “examination of current concepts and types of discourse [...] with no particular therapeutic purpose, but for its 
own sake” (p. 517). Herein, I focus on paradoxes and perplexity.  
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The idea is familiar. Consider, for example, the following argument: some dreams are 
indistinguishable from sensory experience, so my experience is compatible with my being in such a 
dream, so I don’t know that I’m not dreaming and so, finally, I don’t know that I am currently (say) 
sitting in my armchair. When reflecting on the concepts involved, especially KNOWLEDGE, the 
argument seems to be sound but the conclusion (or some appropriate variant thereof) seems to be 
unacceptable: surely I do know that I am currently sitting in my armchair (or that I am currently 
working at my desk, or whatever). Let us call such an argument—an argument such that, when 
reflecting on the concepts involved, the argument seems sound and the conclusion seems 
unacceptable—a conceptual imbalance. Let us call the specific example just given the sceptical 
imbalance.  
To solve a philosophical problem,  
the critical philosopher must not only restore the conceptual balance which has somehow been 
upset; he must also diagnose the particular sources of the loss of balance, show just how it has 
been upset. (ibid.) 
Thus, in response to the sceptical imbalance, it would not be enough (say) to simply insist that I do 
know that I am not dreaming. One would also have to explain why appearances are to the contrary—
why it seems that, given the compatibility of my experience and a vivid dream, I do not have such 
knowledge. More generally, for Strawson, one must do two things to respond to a conceptual 
imbalance: first, one must explain why a given step in the argument is in fact unsound, or why the 
conclusion is in fact acceptable; second, one must explain why appearances are to the contrary. I will 
say that to respond to a conceptual imbalance in this way is to resolve it. So, according to Strawson, 
one solves a philosophical problem by resolving the corresponding conceptual imbalance. 
It is worth noting that this account of philosophical problem presupposes that we have not 
adopted an externalist semantics for concepts that are the target of explication.10 For example, suppose 
in the essentialist tradition of Putnam and Kripke that the semantic content of an explicandum is the 
                                                     
10 Thanks to an anonymous referee for helping me to see this. 
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essence of whatever bears the appropriate causal-historical relation to uses of that explicandum.11 
Then the kind of ‘paradoxes and perplexities’ Strawson has in mind do not arise from reflection on the 
concept involved, but rather from confusion about the extra-conceptual world: the problem of 
scepticism does not require clarification of KNOWLEDGE, but clarification of knowledge.12 For this 
reason, let us put semantic externalism aside for the present. I return to the issue in §5.3. 
 Strawson considers two ways of understanding explication, examining for each how it might 
be used for philosophical clarification in the above sense. According to the first (pp. 504–506), 
explication is “the introduction, for scientific purposes, of scientifically exact and fruitful concepts” 
(p. 504). According to the second (pp. 510–514), explication is the construction of precise systems of 
concepts such that “at least some of the key concepts in the system are, in important respects, very 
close to the ordinary concepts which are to be clarified” (p. 511).  
It is helpful to understand this in light of a distinction drawn by Jonah Schupbach (2017: 676–
680). Schupbach considers how two of the requirements for explicata—similarity and fruitfulness—
are to be weighted. The answer, he suggests, depends on one’s aims. If, following Schupbach’s 
interpretation of Carnap, one’s aim is “the improvement of our concepts in the service of the empirical 
or logicomathematical sciences” (p. 680), then one will prioritise fruitfulness over similarity: “one’s 
explicatum is satisfactory to the extent that it is as similar to the explicandum as fruitfulness allows” 
(p. 677). In contrast if, following Schupbach’s interpretation of Kemeny and Oppenheim (1952), one 
aims to “shed new light on unclear concepts by introducing corresponding concepts more readily 
analyzable” (Schupbach 2017: 680), then one should prioritise similarity over fruitfulness. From this 
perspective, “the explicatum is satisfactory to the extent that it is as fruitful as the more fundamental 
desideratum similarity allows” (p. 679). Thus, according to Schupbach, we can distinguish between 
two types of explication. The first, Carnapian explication, seeks to build precise explicata that are as 
fruitful in the service of the (empirical or logicomathematical) sciences as possible;13 the second, 
                                                     
11 See Kripke 1980; Putnam 1975. 
12 Cf. Williamson 2007. 
13 I put aside the exegetical question of whether Carnapian explication (so defined) is Carnap’s conception of explication. 
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Oppenheimian explication, seeks to build precise explicata that are, in relevant respects, as similar to 
the explicanda as possible.  
This distinction maps onto Strawson’s. Carnapian explication is, broadly speaking, ‘the 
introduction, for scientific purposes, of scientifically exact and fruitful concepts’; and Oppenheimian 
explication is such that ‘at least some of the key concepts in the constructed system will be very close 
to the ordinary concepts which are to be clarified’. Thus, with the distinction so construed, we can see 
Strawson’s critique of explication as having two parts: the first involves an examination of the use of 
Carnapian explication in solving philosophical problems; and the second involves an examination of 
the use of Oppenheimian explication in solving philosophical problems. 
3.2 Strawson on Carnapian Explication 
Strawson’s examination of Carnapian explication includes the rhetorical quotations in the opening 
section of this paper. He suggests that it is “prima facie evident” that Carnapian explication is “utterly 
irrelevant” to philosophical clarification (1963: 505), serving only to “change the subject” (p. 506). It 
is worth spelling out Strawson’s position in more detail.  
Consider two passages. First: 
The scientific uses of language, whether formal or empirical, are extremely highly specialized 
uses. Language has many other employments. We use it in pleading in the law courts; in 
appraising people’s characters and actions; […]; in describing how things look and sound and 
feel like; […]; and so on. It is quite certain that such ways of using language as these may give 
rise to philosophical problems; that the concepts employed in these activities may generate 
perplexity, may call for philosophical clarification. (p. 505) 
There are two things to note here. First, Strawson takes the everyday use of language to be broader 
than the scientific use of language. Second, he takes the everyday use of language and concepts to 
give rise to philosophical problems. The second passage: 
[…] the concepts used in non-scientific kinds of discourse could not literally be replaced by 
scientific concepts serving just the same purposes; […] the language of science could not in 
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this way supplant the language of the drawing-room, the kitchen, the law courts and the novel. 
[…] The kinds of concept we employ are not independent of the kinds of purpose for which 
we employ them […]. (pp. 505–506) 
Part of Strawson’s thought here is that, given that the use of language is narrow in scientific contexts 
and broad in everyday contexts, the concepts introduced for use in science must serve a different 
(narrower) purpose than those deployed in everyday contexts—which is why the former cannot 
straightforwardly supplant the latter. 
 The upshot, not quite made explicit, is this: the concepts used in everyday contexts give rise 
to a particular set of philosophical problems; those introduced for use in scientific contexts, as a result 
of their having narrower purposes, do not give rise to that particular set of philosophical problems. 
By way of example, Strawson alludes to Carnap’s example of WARMER and TEMPERATURE: 
Sensory concepts in general have been a rich source of philosophical perplexity. […] Does it 
follow from the fact that the same object can feel warm to one man and cold to another that 
the object really is neither cold or warm nor cool nor has any such property? [Such] questions 
can be answered, or the facts and difficulties that lead to our asking them can be made plain; 
but not by means of formal exercises in the scientific use of the related concepts of 
temperature, wavelength, frequency. (p. 506) 
Strawson states, here, that a philosophical problem arises in connection with the question posed in the 
quotation. He may have in mind something like the following argument: this plate feels warm to 
Jessica but feels cold to Luke, but warmth and coldness are incompatible properties and there’s no 
reason to say that just one of Jessica and Luke is wrong, so the plate cannot genuinely be warm or 
cold nor have any other such property. The argument is plausibly such that, when reflecting in the 
concepts involved, the argument seems sound while the conclusion seems unacceptable. Assuming so, 
this is a conceptual imbalance; call it the warmth imbalance.  
Strawson’s claim in the passage is that we do not resolve the warmth imbalance by replacing 
WARM, COLD and related concepts with the more scientifically fruitful concept TEMPERATURE. 
Building on the above comments, the principal reason is that scientifically fruitful concepts tend not 
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to give rise to the kind of conceptual imbalance at hand. First, WARM, COLD, etc., are used for a 
greater variety of purposes than TEMPERATURE: for example, the former are perhaps used both to 
track an objective quality of objects and to reflect our sensations thereof, whereas the latter is perhaps 
used merely to track an objective quality of objects.14 This narrowing of purpose prevents the warmth 
imbalance from arising. After replacing WARM, COLD, etc., with TEMPERATURE, arguments designed 
to generate the warmth imbalance are obviously unsound. For example: this plate feels to Jessica to 
have a high temperature, but feels to Luke to have a low temperature, but having a high temperature 
and having a low temperature are incompatible properties and there’s no reason to say that just one 
of Jessica and Luke is wrong, so the plate cannot genuinely have a temperature. The error in the 
argument is clear: TEMPERATURE (defined in terms of thermometers) need not reflect one’s 
sensations, so either Jessica or Luke is straightforwardly mistaken. So, once WARM, COLD, etc., have 
been replaced by TEMPERATURE, the warmth imbalance no longer arises: there is no longer a 
seemingly sound argument for a seemingly unacceptable conclusion.  
But none of this serves to resolve the warmth imbalance. Firstly, it does not automatically 
follow from the fact that TEMPERATURE need not reflect one’s sensations, that WARM, COLD, etc., also 
need not reflect one’s sensations: we cannot simply infer that, because Jessica or Luke is 
straightforwardly mistaken about the plate’s temperature, either Jessica or Luke must likewise be 
straightforwardly mistaken about the plate being warm/cold. Moreover, even if such an inference 
could be justified, highlighting a step in the argument that generates the warmth imbalance as 
fallacious would not tell us why that step seems to be sound. Replacing WARM, COLD, etc., with 
TEMPERATURE would not serve to explain why there is something intuitively amiss—assuming that 
                                                     
14 An anonymous referee suggests that there might in fact be two concepts denoted by ‘WARM’: one that tracks an objective 
property, and one that tracks a subjective property. If this is right, then, on either reading, the argument used to set up the 
warmth imbalance is obviously unsound: on the objective reading, there is reason to say that just one of Jessica and Luke is 
wrong; on the subjective reading, warmth and coldness are not incompatible. This insight would potentially allow us to 
resolve the warmth imbalance (without appealing to Carnapian explication), by explaining why the two distinct concepts are 
sometimes conflated. For expository purposes, however, I put this possibility aside; I assume that ‘WARM’ denotes a single 
concept. 
12 
 
there is something intuitively amiss—with the thought that one can be straightforwardly mistaken 
about whether a plate is warm or cold. Rather than resolving the warmth imbalance, Carnapian 
explication replaces the explicanda with a set of concepts for which the conceptual imbalance does 
not arise. And as Justus writes, “[d]esertion does not constitute illumination” (2012: 171). 
Let me summarise Strawson’s argument here. A philosophical problem is solved by resolving 
the corresponding conceptual imbalance. Conceptual imbalances arise due to some aspect of the 
interaction between the different purposes for which a concept is used. But, when one performs a 
Carnapian explication, one replaces that concept with a counterpart that is explicitly designed to be 
used for much narrower purposes. As such, if one attempts to reconstruct the conceptual imbalance 
using relevant explicata, one will see that the conceptual imbalance no longer arises: either the 
argument does not seem to be sound, or the conclusion does not seem to be unacceptable. However, 
performing this Carnapian explication—and thereby blocking the conceptual imbalance—does not 
resolve the conceptual imbalance. The Carnapian explication has not told us why the unsound step in 
the original argument seems to be sound, or else how or why the acceptable conclusion seems to be 
unacceptable—why, as it were, reflection on the concepts involved can lead us astray. Thus, Strawson 
concludes, Carnapian explication fails to solve the philosophical problem.  
Let me make three points of clarification. First, it is essential here that we are talking about 
Carnapian explication rather than Oppenheimian explication. For Strawson, constructing a concept 
for scientific fruitfulness will narrow down its purpose, thereby removing the conceptual imbalances 
that are central to his conception of philosophical problems, and it is this removal that underpins his 
criticism. There is no reason to think that a parallel claim could be made about an explicatum 
designed to maximise similarity to the explicandum. 
Second, for the objection to have any force, we must have in mind Carnapian full explication 
rather than Carnapian partial explication. It is the replacement of WARM, COLD, etc., with 
TEMPERATURE, not the mere introduction of the latter, that prevents us from formulating the 
philosophical problem. The introduction of TEMPERATURE does not remove the conceptual imbalance, 
nor does it hinder any attempt we might make to resolve it. It is the elimination of WARM, COLD, etc., 
that causes the difficulty. 
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Third, there is no essential distinction here between ‘everyday’ and ‘scientific’ concepts, 
contexts, language, or anything else.15 What is important for the objection is just that Carnapian 
explication, in designing concepts for fruitfulness in the service of science, will yield explicata that do 
not give rise to the particular conceptual imbalances to which the explicanda are known to give rise. 
This claim does not require a problematic, sharp distinction between the everyday and the scientific. 
3.3 Strawson on Oppenheimian Explication 
Oppenheimian explication, recall, seeks to maximise how similar the explicatum is to the 
explicandum in some relevant respects. According to Strawson, Oppenheimian explications are to be 
accompanied with “extra-systematic remarks” in order to “explain the meaning of the linguistic 
expressions for the constructed concepts in terms which do not belong to the theory” (1963: 512). 
This is particularly important when we have philosophical problems in mind: 
[…] if the clear mode of functioning of the constructed concepts is to cast light on problems 
and difficulties rooted in the unclear mode of functioning of the unconstructed concepts, then 
precisely the ways in which  the constructed concepts are connected with and depart from the 
unconstructed concepts must be plainly shown. (p. 513) 
And this, according to Strawson, can only be achieved by “accurately describing the modes of 
functioning of the unconstructed concept” (ibid.). Moreover,  
[…] in so far as the purpose of a constructed system is philosophical clarification, the extra-
systematic remarks, so far from being […] comparatively unimportant trimmings, are just 
what give life and meaning to the whole enterprise. (ibid.) 
That is, if one uses Oppenheimian explication to solve a philosophical problem, then it is the extra-
systematic remarks, not the explication per se, that do the work. 
For example, suppose that a theorist aims to resolve the warmth imbalance. She might 
proceed by offering an Oppenheimian explication, constructing a system of concepts, WARM′, COLD′, 
                                                     
15 Cf. Carnap 1963. 
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etc., that are in relevant respects very similar to the explicanda. Perhaps, say, an object x falls under 
WARM′ or COLD′ at t if the typical healthy human at room temperature would, upon contact with x at t, 
have one or another particular kind of sensation.16 The theorist might then use the explicata, in some 
way or another, to resolve the warmth imbalance. First, she might point out that, if these explicata are 
used to reconstruct the argument that generates the warmth imbalance, the reconstructed argument is 
unsound: there is reason to say that just one of Jessica and Luke is wrong about the plate being 
warm/cold. Second, she might argue that it may nonetheless seem that neither Jessica nor Luke are 
wrong, because both Jessica and Luke may have an equal prima facie claim to representing the typical 
healthy human. Thus, the theorist may conclude that the warmth imbalance arises because, say, we are 
not sufficiently sensitive to the fact that different healthy humans can have different sensations in 
parallel circumstances. 
The details, here, are not important. According to Strawson, the pivotal step—the step that 
‘gives life and meaning’ to any such resolution—is the provision of an explanation of exactly how the 
explicata are similar to the explicanda. The idea is this. First, the theorist’s resolution of the warmth 
imbalance will turn on her ability to explain exactly how WARM′ and COLD′ are similar to WARM and 
COLD. And this explanation, Strawson claims, must make close reference to the behaviour of the 
explicanda. But then, so goes the thought, it is the theorist’s understanding of this behaviour that 
enables her to resolve the warmth imbalance: she could resolve the warmth imbalance simply by 
reflecting on her explanation of how WARM and COLD are tied to judgements about the typical healthy 
human’s sensations. For Strawson, the additional step of constructing and introducing the explicata is 
unnecessary. It is the explanation—rather than the explication—that does the work in philosophically 
clarifying the explicanda; the explication itself “must remain ancillary” (p. 517). 
There are two points to make explicit. First, Strawson is not arguing that Oppenheimian 
explication is irrelevant to solving philosophical problems, nor is he claiming that it changes the 
                                                     
16 As things stand, WARM′ and COLD′ are probably not sufficiently precise to count as candidate explicata. The theorist of the 
example would need to provide more precise definitions—perhaps defining the sensations demonstratively, providing a more 
concrete account of ‘the typical healthy human’, and so on. 
15 
 
subject. Strawson accepts that Oppenheimian explication may help solve philosophical problems; he 
simply downplays its importance. Second, in contrast to before, it is inessential here that we are 
talking about Oppenheimian full explication rather than Oppenheimian partial explication. Strawson’s 
critique of Oppenheimian explication does not rely on the replacement of explicanda, but on the 
comparative importance of the extra-systematic remarks.17 
3.4 Summary 
Strawson critically examines two ways in which explication might be used as a method of 
philosophical clarification. First, if one seeks to use Carnapian full explication to solve a 
philosophical problem, thereby replacing the concepts used to formulate the philosophical problem 
with concepts designed to be fruitful for science, then one will change the subject. The reason is that 
concepts designed to be fruitful for science have narrower purposes than the concepts they are to 
replace, and thus do not give rise to the philosophical problems at hand. Second, if one seeks to use 
Oppenheimian explication to solve a philosophical problem, thereby constructing concepts that are 
maximally similar to the concepts used to formulate the philosophical problem, then it will not be the 
explication per se that does the work but the extra-systematic remarks relating the explicata and 
explicanda. So when it comes to solving philosophical problems, Strawson concludes that Carnapian 
full explication changes the subject and Oppenheimian explication is ancillary.  
4. Extant Responses 
There are three prominent lines of response to Strawson’s critique. With the critique spelt out in 
detail, we can see that none of the objections fully undermine that critique. Nonetheless, each 
response bears upon the critique in an important and instructive way. 
                                                     
17 It is also inessential that we are talking about Oppenheimian explication rather than Carnapian explication. Strawson 
could accept that, if Carnapian explication were relevant to a philosophical problem, it would nonetheless be the explanation 
of how it is relevant that would ‘give life and meaning’ to any subsequent solution. 
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4.1 Pocketknives and Microtomes 
In response to Strawson, Carnap states that he is “firmly convinced” that “an explication given, not in 
the ordinary language, but in a scientific, technically constructed language [can] be useful for the 
solution of a philosophical problem” (1963: 934), something he takes Strawson to explicitly deny. He 
gives the following oft-quoted analogy:18 
A natural language is like a crude, primitive pocketknife, very useful for a hundred different 
purposes. But for certain specific purposes, special tools are more efficient, e.g., chisels, 
cutting-machines, and finally the microtome. If we find that the pocket knife is too crude for a 
given purpose and creates defective products, we shall try to discover the cause of the failure, 
and then either use the knife more skilfully, or replace it for this special purpose by a more 
suitable tool, or even invent a new one. [Strawson’s] thesis is like saying that by using a 
special tool we evade the problem of the correct use of the cruder tool. But would anyone 
criticize the bacteriologist for using a microtome, and assert that he is evading the problem of 
correctly using a pocketknife? (pp. 938–939) 
There are two brief points to make in response to Carnap. 
 First, pace Carnap, Strawson does not deny that explication per se can be useful for solving 
philosophical problems—he accepts, for example, that Oppenheimian explication can play an 
ancillary role. Rather, Strawson denies that replacing concepts of interest with those designed to be 
fruitful for science can help to solve philosophical problems. 
 Second, as observed by Patrick Maher, Carnap’s analogy is misplaced:  
nobody would criticize the bacteriologist, but that is because the bacteriologist’s problem was 
not about the pocketknife. However, the relevant analogy for “one who seeks philosophical 
illumination of essential concepts of non-scientific discourse” is someone who seeks 
knowledge of proper use of the pocketknife […]. (2007: 333) 
                                                     
18 See, e.g., Loomis and Juhl 2006; Maher 2007: 323–323; Olsson 2015: 69; Schupbach 2015: 13. 
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Thus, Carnap’s analogy does not tell against Strawson’s critique: firstly, one would not gain 
knowledge of the proper use of a pocketknife by replacing it with a microtome; and, secondly, if 
somehow one were to gain such knowledge via a microtome, then detailed antecedent knowledge of 
how pocketknife-use is related to microtome-use would be required.19 
 Nonetheless, Carnap’s response does bear on Strawson’s critique. Carnap’s analogy trades on 
the thought that, when one is not specifically interested in the explicandum, explication appears to be 
unproblematic. For example, the astronomers’ explication of PLANET is unproblematic in part because 
they sought to provide a principled taxonomy of celestial bodies, rather than to better understand the 
source of puzzlement in our everyday conception of planethood. A parallel point applies in some 
philosophical cases: explication appears to be unproblematic for cases in which one is not seeking to 
philosophically clarify the explicandum.20 For example, if one seeks to philosophically clarify 
KNOWLEDGE in light of the sceptical imbalance, then it is a viable strategy to explicate (say) SENSORY 
EXPERIENCE in setting up the problem. Or, alternatively, if one seeks to provide a principled 
taxonomy of epistemic states (rather than to resolve the sceptical imbalance), then it is a viable 
strategy to explicate KNOWLEDGE. These points do not serve to undermine Strawson’s critique of 
what he calls “philosophical problems”; rather, they show that Strawson’s understanding of 
philosophical problems is not exhaustive and that his critique is unlikely to fully generalise. I return to 
this line of thought in §5. 
4.2 Arguments by Analogy 
A number of authors have responded to Strawson’s critique along the following lines.21 Suppose that 
we are interested in whether concept C has property F—i.e. in whether F(C)—but have been unable to 
determine an answer directly. Then, we might explicate C, resulting in explicatum C′. Given that C′ is 
                                                     
19 As an anonymous referee notes, it is essential to this response that we have put aside semantic externalism—and that we 
are interested in concepts (the pocketknife) rather than the extra-conceptual world (bacteria). See the comment in §3.1, and 
see §5.3 for further discussion. Cf. Williamson 2007. 
20 A similar point is made by Brun (2016: 1219) and Schupbach (2017: 685). 
21 See: Brun 2016: 1219; Maher 2007: 333–334; Olsson 2015: 69–70; Schupbach 2017: 691. 
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more precise than C, we might be able to establish (say) that F(C′). Then, pointing to the similarity 
between C and C′, we might argue that, by analogy, F(C). Call an argument of this form an argument 
by analogy. 
Patrick Maher develops the idea most explicitly (2007: 333–334). He begins by supposing 
that we seek to determine whether a sentence S of ordinary language is true: we proceed by replacing 
the imprecise concepts in S with explicata, thereby forming a corresponding sentence S ′, and then we 
determine the truth value of S ′. Maher argues that this can help to determine the truth value of S: 
(1) The attempt to formulate S ′ often shows that the original sentence S was ambiguous or 
incomplete and needs to be stated more carefully. (2) If the explicata appearing in S ′ are 
known to correspond well to their explicanda in other cases, that is a reason to think that they 
will correspond well in this case too, and hence to think that the truth value of S will be the 
same as that of S ′. (3) We can translate the proof or disproof of S ′ into a parallel argument 
about the corresponding explicanda and see if this seems to be sound; if so, we obtain a direct 
argument for or against S. (p. 334) 
Maher concludes that “explication can provide insights and lines of argument that we may not 
discover if we reason only in terms of the vague explicanda” (ibid.). 
 Maher gives an example. Consider the sentence: “A law of the form ‘All F are G’ is 
confirmed by evidence that something is both F and G”. Second, suppose that we explicate 
CONFIRMATION, replacing it with a more precise concept CONFIRMATION′. Then, (1), as available 
formal notions of confirmation are sensitive to background evidence, we will discover that our 
original sentence is ambiguous. Here is Maher’s disambiguation: 
 
N: A law of the form ‘All F are G’ is confirmed by evidence that something is both F and G, 
given no background evidence. 
 
We then construct an analogue of N by replacing “confirmed” with “confirmed′ ”. Call the analogue 
N ′. Regarding (2), Maher (assuming his preferred explication of CONFIRMATION) cites a proof that N ′ 
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is false (Maher 2004). He claims that, as CONFIRMATION corresponds well with CONFIRMATION′ in 
most cases, we thus have reason to suppose that N is false. And (3), Maher claims that, if we translate 
his proof into “qualitative explicandum terms” (2007: 334), we obtain a good direct argument for the 
falsity of N. 
 Arguments by analogy look to be a plausible way in which one might use explication to 
establish results about explicanda. As such, they present an effective response to the simple charge 
that, when it comes to philosophy, explication is irrelevant. However, as we have seen, Strawson’s 
critique is not to be identified with that simple charge. So let us examine the extent to which 
arguments from analogy bear on Strawson’s critique. 
 Suppose we have Strawson’s critique of Carnapian explication in mind. Then, according to 
Strawson, it is the replacement of explicanda that undermines any attempt to solve philosophical 
problems. However, arguments by analogy presuppose that replacement has not taken place: they 
presuppose a partial explication. To see this, recall that arguments by analogy seek to establish F(C) 
by analogy to the independently established F(C′), where C is the explicandum and C′ is the 
explicatum. Such an argument must presuppose a theoretical context in which C′ was designed to do 
the same kind of theoretical work as C—only then is there a relevant analogy between the concepts. 
But the very fact that C is being used in that context demonstrates that, in that context, C has not been 
replaced by C′: only a partial explication has been performed. Thus, arguments by analogy make use 
of partial, as opposed to full, explications. Strawson’s critique, however, is silent about Carnapian 
partial explications. As such, with Carnapian explications in mind, arguments by analogy are 
straightforwardly compatible with Strawson’s critique. 
 One might object to this line of reasoning: why can we not suppose that C has been replaced 
by C′, but is temporarily restored for the performance of the argument by analogy?22 The response is 
that we can suppose this. But, if performing an argument by analogy requires temporarily restoring 
the explicandum, then it would be misleading to suggest that the argument by analogy is making use 
of a full explication. Even if theorists use C′ in place of C in general, the two concepts are being used 
                                                     
22 This objection was raised by an anonymous referee. 
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side-by-side in the specific context in which the argument by analogy is taking place—a context 
which involves applications of both concepts to the relevant subject matter. Arguments by analogy 
make use of partial explications, even if the explicanda have been replaced—and thus have been fully 
explicated—for other theoretical purposes.   
 Suppose now that we have Strawson’s critique of Oppenheimian explication in mind. First, 
according to Strawson, where Oppenheimian explication is used to help solve a philosophical 
problem, what ‘gives life and meaning’ to that solution will be the extra-systematic remarks that 
explain the respects in which the explicatum is similar to the explicandum. Nothing has been said by 
proponents of arguments by analogy to undermine this claim. For example, it remains open for 
Strawson to claim that the plausibility of Maher’s arguments (1)–(3) rely pivotally on Maher’s ability 
to spell out precisely the respects in which CONFIRMATION′ is similar to CONFIRMATION. Indeed, 
without such details, it would be unclear why a translation of Maher’s proof of the falsity of N ′ into 
‘qualitative explicandum terms’ would yield a good direct argument against N. 
 Nonetheless, arguments by analogy do give us reason to think that Strawson has exaggerated 
his case. Arguments by analogy show that Oppenheimian partial explication can play more than an 
ancillary role in solving philosophical problems. Partial explications (whether Carnapian or 
Oppenheimian) play an essential role in arguments by analogy: the introduction of a precise 
explicatum C′ must precede the derivation of F(C′), which is an essential component of the argument 
by analogy. Thus, pace Strawson, partial explication can play an essential, more-than-ancillary role in 
solving philosophical problems. 
4.3 Close Similarity  
It has been suggested, in particular by Jonah Schupbach (2017), that Strawson’s critique principally 
concerns the similarity between explicatum and explicandum.23 According to Schupbach, “Strawson 
maintains that a logically or scientifically precise explicatum can never illuminate an imprecise 
                                                     
23 Strawson’s critique is also explicitly tied to similarity by Brun (2016: 2018–2019) and Dutilh Novaes and Reck (2017: 
202–203). 
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explicandum because they are too dissimilar” (p. 684). Here, Schupbach takes an explicandum and 
explicatum to be similar to “the extent to which properties of the explicandum also hold true of the 
explicatum” (p. 688)—where the properties of an explicandum are manifested in the ordinary 
judgements of those who use that concept, and the properties of an explicatum can be derived through 
analysis of its definition or rules of use.24 To respond to the critique so-construed, one must 
demonstrate how to “establish the similarity of explicatum to explicandum that is necessary in cases 
where one intends for the former to illuminate the latter” (p. 685). 
 Schupbach argues that experimental methods can play a central role in demonstrating that, in 
relevant respects, the explicatum bears close similarity to explicandum. 
[E]mpirical research provides us with crucial information for assessing more directly just how 
well a particular explication does with regards to explication’s similarity desideratum. By 
observing and surveying how particular groups of people apply the relevant term(s) in the 
relevant context(s), we gain […] evidence of how closely overall (in the contexts tested) any 
particular formal explicatum corresponds to the explicandum. (p. 689) 
For example, Schupbach provides initial experimental evidence (first described in his 2011) that the 
quantitative concept ℰ(e,h)—the explanatory strength of h over evidence e—bears close similarity to 
the ordinary concept EXPLANATORY POWER. Here: 
ℰ(𝑒, ℎ) =
𝑃𝑟(ℎ|𝑒) − 𝑃𝑟(ℎ|¬𝑒)
𝑃𝑟(ℎ|𝑒) + 𝑃𝑟(ℎ|¬𝑒)
 . 
Participants were told the initial contents of two urns, A and B, which contained different numbers of 
black and white balls, and then shown balls being drawn without replacement from a randomly 
selected urn (participants did not know which). After each draw, the participants were asked to judge 
the power of two potential explanations—‘balls are being drawn from A’ and ‘balls are being drawn 
from B’—of the results of the draws thus far. These judgements were then compared to the 
                                                     
24 Although Schupbach is not explicit about this, I understand the idea to be that the ‘properties’ in question include, in 
particular, extension in various (everyday) actual and hypothetical scenarios, and inferential connections with other related 
concepts. If this is right, then Schupbach’s understanding of simplicity differs from Carnap’s (see footnote 6). 
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corresponding value of ℰ(e,h), both as determined by objective probability and by the participants’ 
subjective probabilities. Schupbach summarises the results thus: 
results derived from ℰ sit closer, on average, to participant judgments of explanatory power, 
and the mean residual corresponding to ℰ is closer to the ideal value of zero than that 
corresponding to any other measure.25 (2017: 694) 
(See Schupbach 2011 and 2017: 692–695 for details.) Schupbach takes this to be clear—albeit not 
conclusive—evidence that the explicatum bears close similarity to the explicandum. Given sufficient 
evidence of this kind, close similarity could be established.  
 Schupbach has spelt out a powerful experimental method for establishing that, in one good 
sense, an explicatum is similar to an explicandum in relevant respects. However, given that (as seen in 
§3) Strawson’s critique does not rely on the claim that we cannot determine whether explicata are 
similar to explicanda, Schupbach’s method does not automatically constitute a response to Strawson’s 
critique. Let’s examine the issue more closely. 
Firstly, if one is using Carnapian explication, then one will prioritise fruitfulness for science 
over similarity. As such, the kind of empirical work advocated by Schupbach will be trumped by the 
fruitfulness requirement.26 Strawson can thus maintain that the explicatum in a Carnapian explication 
will not give rise to the relevant conceptual imbalance—and thus that Carnapian explication is not 
helpful in solving philosophical problems. 
 The situation is less clear in the case of Oppenheimian explication. One line Strawson could 
take is that Schupbach’s experimental method in fact supports his claim that the extra-systematic 
remarks are what ‘give life and meaning’ to an attempt to solve a philosophical problem. Let me 
                                                     
25 The mean residual corresponding to a measure of explanatory power is the average difference between the value of that 
measure and the participants’ judgements of explanatory power. The participants recorded their judgements by placing a 
mark along a line, with one end of the line representing an extremely poor explanation and the other end representing an 
extremely good explanation; these marks were later converted to numerical values (between –1 and 1) for analysis. See 
Schupbach 2011 for details.  
26 For this reason, Schupbach only sees his approach as being relevant to Oppenheimian explication. 
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explain. Schupbach intends his empirical work to demonstrate the respects in which the explicata are 
similar to the explicanda. As such, for Strawson, that empirical work is not a constituent of the 
explication per se, but is rather a part of the extra-systematic remarks. But then, plausibly, 
Schupbach’s experimental method merely serves to emphasise how much clarificatory work can in 
fact be done by a full set of extra-systematic remarks. If Schupbach were to use ℰ(e,h) to solve a 
philosophical problem arising from consideration of EXPLANATORY POWER, then—modulo the 
comments made in the previous section—it would be open for Strawson to maintain that the principal 
work is done by Schupbach’s empirical work, and thus the extra-systematic remarks, rather than the 
explication per se.  
 What we say here, however, ultimately depends on what counts as a constituent of an 
explication. Strawson assumes that explanations of how explicata are similar to explicanda, i.e. his 
extra-systematic remarks, are not constituents of corresponding explications. This assumption is 
natural if one conceptualises explication as an action of replacement.27 If explication is conceptualised 
in this way, then a theorist performs an explication by replacing an old concept with an appropriate 
counterpart, and an explication can be evaluated according to the how well the explicatum satisfies 
the four requirements of similarity, precision, fruitfulness and simplicity. Discussion of those 
requirements will not be a part of the explication per se, but rather a justification for it; and so, a 
fortiori, any extra-systematic remarks will not be a constituent of the corresponding explication. From 
this perspective, as noted above, Schupbach’s experimental method plausibly supports Strawson’s 
critique of Oppenheimian explication. 
 However, one need not conceptualise explication in this way. Instead, one might 
conceptualise explication as a process that effects a replacement.28 So conceptualised, explication may 
have multiple steps, perhaps: first, clarify the sense in which explicanda are to be explicated; second, 
construct explicata that satisfy the four requirements of similarity, precision, fruitfulness and 
simplicity to a sufficient degree; and, third, replace the explicanda with the explicata. It is natural, 
                                                     
27 For example, this seems to be how Brun conceptualises the method. See his 2016: 1220.  
28 For example, see Dutilh Novaes and Reck 2017: 199. 
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here, to see discussion of the four requirements not as justificatory, but rather as part of the process: 
in particular, consideration of the requirements is an essential part of completing the second step. As 
such, any extra-systematic remarks will be a constituent of the explication per se.  
 How, if explication is a process, does Schupbach’s experimental method bear on Strawson’s 
critique of Oppenheimian explication? Not at all. The reason is that, from this perspective, Strawson’s 
critique of Oppenheimian explication seems somewhat confused from the outset: it is nonsensical to 
downplay the importance of a process by emphasising the importance of part of that process, 
regardless of whether experimental methods can be used at that part of the process. So, if explication 
is conceptualised as a process, then Strawson’s critique of Oppenheimian explication fails—but 
independently of Schupbach’s response. 
I do not at this stage, however, want to make too much of the distinction between explication-
as-action and explication-as-process. Strawson’s critique targets the acts of introducing an explicatum 
and replacing the explicandum, regardless of whether such acts are to be identified as (partial and full) 
explications. Where exactly we draw the boundaries of an explication seems little more than 
theoretical bookkeeping. For the sake of argument, then, I henceforth assume that explication is an 
action; that is, that the extra-systematic remarks are not part of the explication. 
  Thus, while Schupbach has provided us with a method for demonstrating that, in one good 
sense, explicata bear close similarity to explicanda, this does not constitute a response to Strawson’s 
critique. First, Schupbach’s experimental method is largely irrelevant to Strawson’s objection to the 
use of Carnapian explication in solving philosophical problems. Second, on at least one way of 
conceptualising explication, Schupbach’s experimental method is plausibly construed as adding 
support to Strawson’s critique of Oppenheimian explication.   
5. The Role of Explication in Philosophical Methodology 
Strawson’s critique is a challenge to those who would afford explication a role in philosophical 
methodology. We have already seen that the critique does not seek to show that explication is 
straightforwardly irrelevant; it is in fact compatible with explication playing such a role. First, from 
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the outset, Strawson allows that Oppenheimian explication can help to solve philosophical problems, 
although he downplays the contribution of explications per se. And, second, Strawson builds the 
critique on a specific account of philosophical problems, and the critique may not fully generalise. 
Moreover, pace Strawson, we have seen a style of argument, the argument by analogy, in which 
partial explication appears to play an essential role.  
In this section, I offer a more systematic response to Strawson’s critique. I briefly refine the 
account of explication on the table in §5.1, before tackling the critique head-on in §5.2 and 
generalising to other conceptions of philosophical problems in §5.3. All of this will help to clarify the 
role that explication can play in philosophical methodology. 
5.1 Fruitfulness versus the Carnapian/Oppenheimian Distinction 
Recall that Carnapian explication involves designing explicata to be fruitful for the (empirical or 
logicomathematical) sciences; and Oppenheimian explication involves designing explicata to be 
maximally similar to explicanda in relevant respects. The distinction is useful for Strawson’s (and 
Schupbach’s) specific purposes. But, for two reasons, it is not so helpful when thinking about 
explication more generally.  
First, very briefly, the distinction is not exhaustive. For example, one might design an 
explicatum to be fruitful for philosophy, or to have an optimal balance of fruitfulness and similarity.  
Second, more fundamentally, the apparent need for the distinction rests on an unhelpfully 
narrow conception of fruitfulness. Both Strawson (1963: 504) and Schupbach (2017: 675) think of 
fruitfulness in broadly Carnapian terms: an explicatum is fruitful insofar as it facilitates the 
formulation of empirical laws or logical theorems. With fruitfulness so construed, a theorist who 
seeks to illuminate the explicandum must prioritise similarity over fruitfulness.  
However, Carnap’s account of fruitfulness is inappropriate for many areas of theoretical 
inquiry. For one example, the astronomers’ explication of PLANET appears to have been fruitful not 
because it features in laws or theorems, but because it facilitated the development of a principled, 
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standardised taxonomy of celestial objects.29 Others have made a similar observation, for example 
Kitcher argues that Carnap’s account of fruitfulness is “deeply problematic for the biological, earth 
and human sciences” (2008: 115), and Shepherd and Justus argue that it is inappropriate for normative 
concepts (2015: 392f). To avoid such concerns, I suggest that we tie fruitfulness to the specific 
theoretical aims that led to the introduction of the explicatum: if a theorist seeks to answer various 
theoretical questions, then the explicatum will be fruitful insofar as it allows one to answer such 
questions (Kitcher 2008); and if a theorist seeks new knowledge about some phenomenon, then the 
explicatum will be fruitful insofar as it leads to such knowledge (Dutilh Novaes and Reck 2017: 206); 
and so on.  
From this perspective, there is no need to draw a distinction between Carnapian and 
Oppenheimian explication. If a theorist aims her explicatum to be useful for science, then the 
explicatum will be fruitful insofar as it is useful for science. Alternatively, if a theorist aims to 
illuminate an explicandum, then the explicatum will be fruitful insofar as it facilitates such 
illumination; if illumination requires the explicatum to bear close similarity to the explicandum, then 
this will be subsumed under the fruitfulness requirement. Likewise for other theoretical aims: 
whatever the aim, it is fruitfulness that is to be prioritised. I recommend, then, that we drop the 
distinction between Carnapian and Oppenheimian explication. 
5.2 Assessing Strawson’s Critique 
In this subsection, I tackle Strawson’s critique head on, keeping in mind his underlying account of 
philosophical problems, introduced in §3.1. I will use the sceptical imbalance as a running example.  
There are three variables that affect the force of the critique as applied to the sceptical 
imbalance. First, the explicandum might be KNOWLEDGE, or it might be something else, say, SENSORY 
EXPERIENCE. Presumably, if the explicandum is the latter, the intention is that the explicatum clarify, 
or help draw out, the sceptical imbalance. Accordingly, I assume that explicating SENSORY 
EXPERIENCE does not affect whether or not the sceptical imbalance arises. Second, in designing the 
                                                     
29 See Pinder 2017a. 
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explicatum, the explicator might aim to build a concept that is any number of things, such as useful 
for contemporary psychology, useful for contemporary epistemology, maximally similar to the 
explicandum, or something else. And, third, the explication may be full or partial.  
First, then, suppose that a philosopher explicates SENSORY EXPERIENCE. Then, ex hypothesi, 
the sceptical imbalance still arises—regardless of whether the philosopher designed the explicatum 
for this specific purpose or whether she (say) adopted an explicatum originally designed for use in 
psychology or epistemology, and regardless of whether the explicandum is replaced. As such, the 
explication will be immune to Strawson’s charge of changing the subject. However, such an 
explication plausibly does play only an ancillary role in any subsequent solution to the philosophical 
problem: the explication helps us to understand the problem, rather than to solve it. 
Suppose instead that a philosopher explicates KNOWLEDGE, and is to replace the 
explicandum. That is, the philosopher will fully explicate KNOWLEDGE. Then, for Strawson, a key 
question is whether the explicatum also gives rise to the sceptical imbalance. If it does, then 
Strawson’s grounds for claiming a change of subject will be undercut. In such a case, the explicit 
precision afforded by the explicatum could potentially make it possible to resolve the sceptical 
imbalance. If this were so, then the explication would certainly not be ancillary, instead playing an 
essential role in solving the philosophical problem.  
For example, suppose that one explicates KNOWLEDGE, with the explicatum defined by an 
appropriate contextualist account of knowledge.30 Call the explicatum “C-KNOWLEDGE”. This 
explicatum plausibly would give rise to the sceptical imbalance, in something like the following 
sense: if we reconstruct the derivation of the sceptical imbalance by replacing each use of 
KNOWLEDGE with an appropriate use of C-KNOWLEDGE, then each step in that derivation will be valid 
in a (salient) context of utterance. One might then hope to resolve the sceptical imbalance by pointing 
to the fact that the reconstructed derivation as a whole is invalid from any given context of utterance: 
                                                     
30 See e.g. DeRose 1995; Lewis 1996.  
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our mistake, in deriving the sceptical imbalance, is in failing to recognise shifts in contexts of 
utterance.31  
It will be a matter of judgement whether an explicatum gives rise to a given conceptual 
imbalance (and, a fortiori, whether I am right to suggest that C-KNOWLEDGE gives rise to the sceptical 
imbalance). The judgement should turn principally on whether the derivation of the conceptual 
imbalance can be naturally reconstructed using the explicatum, in such a way that it is clear why each 
step in the derivation might seem sound and why the conclusion might seem unacceptable. If the 
derivation can be naturally reconstructed in this way, we may judge that the explicatum does give rise 
to the conceptual imbalance. This is an issue to be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
If the explicatum replacing KNOWLEDGE does not give rise to the sceptical imbalance, then 
the explication will be open to the charge of changing the subject. Strawson takes this to be the 
inevitable outcome of using an explicatum designed for use in science, as it will have a purpose too 
narrow to give rise to the sceptical imbalance. For example, we might imagine that a philosopher 
adopts an explicatum designed for fruitfulness in psychology—perhaps TACIT KNOWLEDGE, defined 
roughly as a body of information (construed non-factively) stored in a module, such as our native 
language or the content stored in the visual system. If KNOWLEDGE is replaced by TACIT 
KNOWLEDGE, then the sceptical imbalance is likely not to arise: in ordinary situations, our visual 
system plausibly contains tacit knowledge of our immediate surroundings whether or not we can 
distinguish current experience from a vivid dream. I am not sure whether this point generalises to all 
explicata designed for use in science, but a tempered analogue of Strawson’s objection here appears 
correct: fully explicating a concept that gives rise to a philosophical problem, where the explicatum 
has been designed for use in science, will typically constitute a change of subject. 
One might be tempted to respond: “No philosopher would seek to solve a philosophical 
problem by replacing the concepts of interest with concepts designed for use in science in this way! 
So, as an objection to explication, this is spurious!” However, firstly, there are readings of, for 
                                                     
31 This is not to say that contextualism about knowledge solves the problem of scepticism as standardly construed. See e.g. 
Kornblith 2000. 
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example, Carnap (1963: 934) and Quine (1969; 1975; cf. Fumerton 1994) on which they are doing 
just that. So the objection is not spurious. Secondly, even for more sophisticated uses of explication, 
there is something to be learnt. The objection arises whenever the explicatum does not give rise to the 
conceptual imbalance in question. This is likely to happen in the present example if the explicatum for 
KNOWLEDGE is designed for use in psychology; but it might also happen if the explicatum is designed 
for use in epistemology, or perhaps even if it is designed to be maximally similar to our ordinary 
concept. In such cases, replacing KNOWLEDGE with the explicatum will not serve to resolve the 
sceptical imbalance. 
For example, a philosopher might replace KNOWLEDGE with the explicatum RELIABILIST 
KNOWLEDGE. Let us assume that the explicatum does not give rise to the sceptical imbalance, as (say) 
my belief that I am sitting in my armchair may have been formed by a reliable belief-forming-
mechanism, and thus may fall under RELIABILIST KNOWLEDGE, even if my experience is 
indistinguishable from a vivid dream. Such a replacement per se, however, does not constitute a 
solution to the philosophical problem at hand: it does not serve to explain why, when reflecting on the 
concepts involved in the original formulation of the sceptical imbalance, it seems that I do not know 
that I am sitting in my armchair.  
Suppose now that the philosopher does not fully explicate KNOWLEDGE, but instead partially 
explicates it. If the explicatum does give rise to the sceptical imbalance, then the points above about 
C-KNOWLEDGE will straightforwardly carry over. So let us assume that the explicatum does not give 
rise to the sceptical imbalance. Two points immediately follow: firstly, despite not giving rise to the 
sceptical imbalance, the explication will not change the subject as the explicandum may still be used 
in the relevant theoretical contexts; and, secondly, the explication will open up the opportunity for 
arguments by analogy, and thus may play more than an ancillary role in solving the philosophical 
problem.  
For example, a philosopher might partially explicate KNOWLEDGE with the explicatum 
RELIABILIST KNOWLEDGE. Then (rather than simply eliminating the explicandum), she might point to 
appropriate similarities between KNOWLEDGE and RELIABILIST KNOWLEDGE in order to resolve the 
sceptical imbalance. To do this, she might argue by analogy (say) that my belief that I am sitting in 
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my armchair falls under not only RELIABILIST KNOWLEDGE, but also KNOWLEDGE.32 If successful, 
then the explication would have played an essential role in solving the philosophical problem. 
In such a case, a careful, detailed explanation of the relation between explicatum and 
explicandum is pivotal. We need to understand how RELIABILIST KNOWLEDGE and our everyday 
concept KNOWLEDGE are related to each other, and how they are both related to the sceptical 
imbalance: we need an explanation of why and how we can learn about our everyday concept from 
the introduced concept. One might hope to make use of Schupbach’s experimental approach 
(discussed in §4.3), or something else. Either way, Strawson is right to emphasise the importance of 
the extra-systematic remarks—even if he is wrong to downplay the importance of explication. 
5.3 Alternative Conceptions of Philosophical Problems 
So far, we have followed Strawson’s account of philosophical problems as conceptual imbalances. 
For Strawson, philosophers seek to understand how our concepts give rise to apparent paradoxes and 
perplexities, and how we can make sense of such paradoxes and perplexities. This may be a good 
model for some philosophical problems, but it is inadequate as a general account: I see little reason to 
insist that all philosophical problems be characterised as paradoxes and perplexities. Moreover, as 
suggested above, Strawson’s critique is unlikely to fully generalise. It is not possible here to develop 
and examine a full taxonomy of types of philosophical problem. Instead, let me consider the role that 
explication might play with respect to two broad, alternative ways that one might think about the 
problem of scepticism. This will serve to illustrate some different ways in which the above discussion 
may generalise. 
First, one might take a philosophical problem not to concern some given concept, but rather to 
concern whatever in the world that concept is about. For example, one might object to the idea that 
the problem of scepticism demands merely a clarification of KNOWLEDGE, claiming instead that it is a 
problem about knowledge.33 This approach to philosophical problems is most naturally tied to 
                                                     
32 Something like this seems to be the idea in Olsson 2015, although Olsson does not explicitly discuss scepticism. 
33 See e.g. Williamson 2007. 
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semantic externalism, which we temporarily put aside in §3.1. Along these lines, one might reason 
thus: there is something we call “knowledge”; we value that something and would like to understand 
what it is; the sceptical imbalance highlights a flaw in our understanding of it; and so the sceptical 
imbalance is a problem to solve in pursuit of a full theory of what we call “knowledge”. On this 
approach, our everyday concept KNOWLEDGE has (via some appropriate reference-fixing mechanism) 
latched onto something in the world (such as a kind of mental state), and it is the latter, not the former, 
which is of philosophical interest. 
With the problem so construed, a number of points can be made about the use of explication. 
Firstly, there is no in-principle objection to the use of explication to refine related concepts such as 
SENSORY EXPERIENCE. Such an explication will be desirable if performed with a relevant theoretical 
aim, such as to bring knowledge into better focus, but is likely to remain ancillary. Secondly, there is 
no in-principle objection to a partial explication of KNOWLEDGE: so long as we can still use the 
explicandum to pick out knowledge, there will be no change of subject. There is thus the possibility 
that arguments by analogy play an important role in making discoveries about knowledge and, a 
fortiori, that explication play an essential, not merely ancillary, role. Thirdly, a full explication of 
KNOWLEDGE is liable to be accused of changing the subject unless good evidence can be given that 
reference has been preserved across the explication. If such evidence can be provided, then the 
explication might serve, for example, to eliminate some of the confusions inherent in our ordinary 
way of thinking about knowledge. However, the provision of such evidence may well depend, at least 
to some extent, on an independent grasp of knowledge—in which case the explication per se (or, at 
least, the replacement) would be ancillary. So a variant of Strawson’s critique holds for a full 
explication of KNOWLEDGE: the explication will be open to the charge of changing the subject, or else 
be ancillary. 
Another way to think of a philosophical problem is as a problem targeting some general 
phenomenon. From this perspective, the relevant philosophical problem does not target a specific 
concept, nor the extension of that concept; rather, it targets some more general phenomenon to which 
the concept and its extension pertain in some way. Thus, rather than thinking of the problem of 
scepticism as targeting KNOWLEDGE or knowledge, we may think of it as targeting the general 
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phenomenon whereby people can be in various epistemic states. For example, in response to the 
problem of scepticism, one might reason thus: people can be in a variety of epistemic states in relation 
to themselves, each other and the outside world; to make sense of this, we need a principled taxonomy 
of epistemic states; as a first approximation, we may distinguish belief, justified belief, knowledge, 
etc.; but when we look closer at actual epistemic behaviour—how epistemic states are initially 
formed, how they are revised in light of new information, what actions they lead to, whether these 
practices are conducive to the satisfaction of desires, world-to-mind states, pro-attitudes or something 
else, etc.—it may turn out that we need to improve upon our initial taxonomy; the sceptical imbalance 
highlights a general difficulty in delineating any factive state, whether we call it “knowledge” or 
something else; and so the sceptical imbalance is a problem that may bear on our attempt to find a 
principled way to distinguish different kinds of epistemic state. On this approach, the problem of 
scepticism is principally a technical challenge in the development of a principled taxonomy of 
epistemic concepts.  
Again, a number of points can be made about the use of explication in solving the 
philosophical problem so construed. Firstly, in order to refine and clarify our initial taxonomy, it will 
almost certainly be helpful to partially explicate SENSORY EXPERIENCE, KNOWLEDGE, and a variety of 
other epistemic concepts. This will allow the construction of competing systems of concepts, whose 
theoretical and explanatory efficacy can be tested against the phenomena. Secondly, it cannot be 
decided in advance whether those concepts will, or ought to, be fully explicated. Some of the 
constructed systems of epistemic concepts may include explicata of SENSORY EXPERIENCE and 
KNOWLEDGE, but other systems may not.34 One way or another, one such system of concepts may 
emerge as dominant, replacing earlier taxonomies. If that system contains an explicatum of SENSORY 
EXPERIENCE or KNOWLEDGE, then that concept will have been fully explicated; otherwise not.  
Thirdly, with the philosophical problem so construed, a charge of changing the subject will 
not apply in the vast majority of cases, whether or not the explicata give rise to the sceptical 
imbalance. So far as I can see, the charge would only be appropriate if a theorist sought to fully 
                                                     
34 See, e.g., Churchland 1981 and the discussion thereof in Pinder 2017b. 
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explicate (say) KNOWLEDGE in such a way that the explicatum was no longer plausibly an epistemic 
concept—say, for example, if one replaced KNOWLEDGE with the concept TRUTH—but it is difficult to 
see a serious epistemologist performing such an explication. Fourthly, explication per se would not 
play a mere ancillary role in this case; rather, it would play a driving role in the construction of a 
taxonomy appropriate for epistemic theorising. Perhaps some particular (partial) explications would 
only play an ancillary role—for example, those that had little effect on the development of the 
taxonomy that ultimately becomes dominant—but this is not a criticism of the role of explication per 
se. 
To reiterate, this is not intended as an exhaustive taxonomy of types of philosophical 
problem. For example, one might think that ethical questions do not fit into any of the three types of 
philosophical problem I have highlighted: questions about how we ought to act may not be merely 
conceptual, nor concern the extension of ‘ought’, nor, in any helpful sense, be about ‘ethical 
phenomena’. I am not sure that such a thought is right but, even if it is, it is no objection to the above 
discussion. The underlying theme in this section is that explication can play an important role in 
philosophical methodology in the right circumstances. To determine whether it will be helpful in a 
given case, one must look closely at the problem at hand and at what exactly the explication is 
supposed to achieve. I have done this, abstractly, for three different ways of conceiving of 
philosophical problems. This explicitly delimits the role that explication can play in solving 
philosophical problems conceived along those lines and, additionally, provides a model for how to 
delimit the role that explication can play in philosophical problems more generally.  
Finally, note that I am not suggesting that each philosopher must adopt just one conception of 
philosophical problems, nor that there is a right conception for a given problem. I am happy, for 
example, for a single epistemologist to undertake three separate projects: to resolve the sceptical 
imbalance; to fully understand the nature of what we ordinarily call “knowledge”; and to develop a 
system of concepts that is specifically designed to capture and explain epistemic phenomena. In each 
case, she may decide to explicate KNOWLEDGE for the respective purpose. So long as, in each case, 
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her use of explication stays within the limits set above—something which is likely to require her to 
explicate KNOWLEDGE in three different ways—I have no objection.35 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Strawson did not object to the general use of explication in philosophy, and certainly not on the 
grounds that it must change the subject. Nor, as others have pointed out, is such a general objection 
sound. Strawson does claim, however, that, in the service of resolving a conceptual imbalance, one 
would change the subject by replacing a concept essential to its formulation with a concept designed 
to be fruitful for science. A tempered variant of that objection is sound, but limited. Ultimately, a 
more systematic investigation is required to delimit the viable use of explication in philosophical 
methodology. Whether or not explication changes the subject depends on how the explication is 
performed, how it is to be used, and how the philosophical problem being tackled has been construed.  
 Strawson also objects that, if one seeks to maximise the similarity between explicatum and 
explicandum, then explication will play only an ancillary role in solving philosophical problems. 
Extant responses in the literature—especially Maher’s arguments by analogy—have already shown 
this objection to be flawed. Again, a more systematic investigation is required to establish when and 
how explication can play an important role in philosophical methodology. This will likewise depend 
upon how the explication is performed, what it is to be used for, and how the philosophical problem 
being tackled has been construed. 
 In responding to Strawson’s critique, I have made some brief but systematic remarks about 
the use of explication in philosophical methodology. One thing that the discussion makes clear is that 
the viability and value of explication will be sensitive to the details of any given case. Before using 
explication in philosophy, then, it is essential to be explicit about exactly how one is using it, for what 
purpose, and how this is relevant to the philosophical problem at hand. Explication can be a powerful 
                                                     
35 See Kitcher 2008 for a discussion of how explication may lead to pluralities of concepts in broadly this way.  
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tool in philosophical methodology but, in any particular case, its applicability ought not to be 
assumed.36 
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8. Appendix 
Summary of results of discussion in §5 
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Figure 1. Summary of the role that explication can play in philosophical methodology. C-
KNOWLEDGE represents an explicatum on which the sceptical imbalance arises, RELIABILIST 
KNOWLEDGE an explicatum (designed for use in epistemology) on which the sceptical imbalance 
does not arise, TACIT KNOWLEDGE an explicatum designed for use in science, and TRUTH an 
explicatum that is not an epistemic concept. The “(?)” indicates that, as TRUTH is not an epistemic 
concept, there are grounds independent of Strawson’s critique for doubting the efficacy of partially 
explicating KNOWLEDGE with TRUTH in order to solve a philosophical problem. 
